Presents a plethora of approaches to developing human potential in areas not conventionally addressed. Organized in two parts, this international collection of essays provides viable educational alternatives to those currently holding sway in an era of high-stakes accountability.

When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even if such (...) a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient’s (former) autonomy since it draws on the ‘wrong’ kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the Personalized Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently ‘fine-tuned’ on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient’s preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient’s own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies. (shrink)

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An informed consent and voluntary assent in biomedical research with adolescents is contingent on a variety of factors, including adolescent and parent perceptions of research risk, benefit, and decision-making autonomy. Thirty-seven adolescents with asthma and their parents evaluated a high or low aversion form of a pediatric asthma research vignette and provided an enrollment decision; their perceptions of family influence over the participation decision; and evaluations of risk, aversion, benefit, and burden of study procedures. Adolescents and their parents agreed on (...) research participation decisions 74% of the time, yet both claimed ultimate responsibility for the participation decision. Both rated most study procedures as significantly more aversive than risky. Parents were more likely to rate aspects of the hypothetical study as beneficial and to provide higher risk ratings for procedures. Disagreements concerning research participation decisions and decision-making autonomy have implications for the exercise of voluntary assent in biomedical research. (shrink)

In the 21st century, the screen - the Internet screen, the television screen, the video screen and all sorts of combinations thereof - will be booming in our visual and infotechno culture. Screen-based art, already a prominent and topical part of visual culture in the 1990s, will expand even more. In this volume, digital art - the new media - as well as its connectedness to cinema will be the subject of investigation. The starting point is a two-day symposium organized (...) by the Netherlands Media Art Institute Montevideo/TBA, in collaboration with the _L&B _ series and the Amsterdam School of Cultural Analysis. Issues which emerged during the course of investigation deal with questions such as: How could screen-based art be distinguished from other art forms? Could screen-based art theoretically be understood in one definite model or should one search for various possibilities and/or models? Could screen-based art be canonized? What are the physical and theoretical forms of representation for screen-based art? What are the idiosyncratic concepts geared towards screen-based art? This volume includes various arguments, positions, and statements by artists, curators, philosophers, and theorists. The participants are Marie-Luise Angerer, Annette W. Balkema, René Beekman, Raymond Bellour, Peter Bogers, Joost Bolten, Noël Carroll, Sean Cubitt, Cãlin Dan, Chris Dercon, Honoré d'O, Anne-Marie Duquet, Ken Feingold, Ursula Frohne, hARTware curators, Heiner Holtappels, Aernout Mik, Patricia Pisters, Nicolaus Schafhausen, Jeffrey Shaw, Peter Sloterdijk, Ed S. Tan, Barbara Visser and Siegfried Zielinski. (shrink)

La sociologie peut-elle nous aider à penser l'éthique? Proposant une nouvelle lecture des " pères fondateurs ", d'Auguste Comte à Max Weber en passant par Emile Durkheim, ce livre revient sur leurs conceptions des liens sociaux. Cette approche non conventionnelle de leurs écrits les plus connus remet en question nombre d'interprétations qui en ont été faites pour renouveler le discours moral. L'auteur montre ainsi que dans ses versions allemande et française, la sociologie s'adosse à des métaphysiques dualistes amenant à enfermer, (...) chacune à sa manière, les êtres humains dans une intériorité solipsiste. Le chapitre consacré à Weber constitue le point culminant de ce parcours : et si l'écrit le plus célèbre de l'histoire de la sociologie, L'Ethique protestante, illustrait une rencontre manquée entre l'exigence éthique et l'ordre temporel? En revisitant de façon originale des classiques de la sociologie, La sociologie et l'oubli du monde ouvre sur cette invitation fondamentale et très actuelle : penser une éthique de la responsabilité, en assumant nos limites et en sachant que la liberté morale n'est pas une liberté vagabonde. (shrink)

Dans un texte relativement peu connu, intitulé Kant, Georg Simmel développe des réflexions critiques à propos de la notion kantienne du bonheur. En comparant celles-ci avec son analyse de la société moderne, telle qu’il la propose dans la Philosophie de l’argent, on s’aperçoit qu’il existe, entre les concepts philosophiques qui y sont mis en œuvre, une relation de correspondance parfaite. La conclusion s’impose que, pour Simmel, la notion kantienne du bonheur trouve comme son incarnation historique dans la culture monétaire. La (...) modernité, que Simmel caractérise par le fait qu’elle offre aux individus la possibilité d’accéder aux objets et aux positions de leur choix, matérialise en effet une aporie inhérente au concept du bonheur chez Kant, dans la mesure où ce dernier souligne l’indétermination totale des choix, d’un côté, et de l’autre, l’idée que c’est hors de la volonté elle-même que la recherche du bonheur puise ses mobiles. (shrink)

David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative (...) schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable? Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term “natural.” “Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.” The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the “artificial” culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant “natural virtues,” and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the “artificial” virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as “natural” and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as “Laws of Nature”. (shrink)

Reading Morgan's eloquent explanation of himself as a "feminist," self-taught and now wholly enthused at the prospect of teaching a Women Writers course, one comes away sharing Morgan's concern that he not be left out in the cold. It is, after all, exciting and revitalizing to be part of a "revolution"—especially if, like Morgan, one can so generously and wholeheartedly espouse its goals; and, at the same time, it is surely comforting and ego-affirming to experience oneself as a legitimate son (...) of that sacred brotherhood, The Community of Scholars. What clearly disturbs Morgan is any suggestion that the two may not yet be compatible and that, further, if forced to choose, Morgan might find himself without viable options on either hand. For, if the larger academic "community" continues to close its professional ranks to women in general and feminists in particular , then Morgan, as a self-styled "feminist" will be forced to seek shelter among the female feminists, many of whom have closed their ranks to men. . . . Beverly Voloshin's Note restores to print some factual information which, for the sake of brevity, I cut from my original article, directing the reader, instead, to James D. Hart's concise summary of the original context of Hawthorne’s letter to Ticknor . While she and Hart make much the same point, her longer explication is, of course, welcome. Additionally, her fine explanation of "what was so daring about Ruth Hall" further reinforces my argument that there are fascinating texts to be discovered in the "feminine fifties" - even if only one or two; certainly, that's better than condemning all the women writers of that decade to obscurity. Moreover, since we teach a number of male texts simply on the grounds of their historical or "sociological" interest, why not also include women's texts on these grounds as well?—especially if, as Voloshin suggests, they reveal "numerous covert rebellions against male authority." How fascinating! One looks forward to her doing more than this. Finally, my main point was not the "feminine fifties" per se, but a plea for the careful reconsideration "of texts by women which have, for one reason or another, been either lost or ignored" . Stretching the "feminine fifties" by only two years, for example, one discovers Rebecca Harding Davis' Life in the Iron Mills , recently reissued by the Feminist Press . Annette Kolodny, assistant professor of English at the University of New Hampshire, has been awarded a Ford Foundation Fellowship for the study of women in society. She has written articles on American literature and culture and a feminist analysis of American pastoral, The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American Life and Letters. (shrink)

Pourquoi l'histoire et la mémoire sont-ils des outils pour penser la démocratie? Face aux crimes contre l'humanité plus que jamais d'actualité, se dessine une responsabilité commune essentielle : celle de cultiver, transmettre l'histoire et en tirer les enseignements. Retraçant sa propre histoire et celle de sa famille, Annette Wieviorka, disposant des témoignages de ses parents, d'archives mais aussi de ses propres souvenirs, dessine d'un même geste les contours d'une biographie collective de ce monde qui a connu l'impensable Shoah. Le (...) souvenir des millions de victimes, cette conscience du temps qui passe, ce sentiment d'appartenir à la dernière génération à pouvoir restituer la mémoire se révèlent vivaces et fondateurs. Surtout, Annette Wieviorka montre que le vrai danger pour la démocratie est dans l'oubli de l'histoire, la grande et celle familiale, quand s'imposent la haine de l'Autre, l'antisémitisme et les extrémismes en tous genres."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Les femmes ont-elles été jugées pour des crimes perpétrés pendant la période nazie? Pour tenter de répondre à cette question, il convient de faire la distinction entre les procès qui se sont déroulés très vite après la capitulation allemande, dans les diverses zones d’occupation et ceux qui se font à Nuremberg, selon un nouveau droit international. Les seconds visent des criminels ayant un degré de responsabilité dans les divers appareils de l’État nazi, responsabilité alors interdite aux femmes. Les premiers, qui (...) se font selon le droit déjà établi, concernent ceux qui ont commis de leurs propres mains des violences meurtrières. On apprendra donc par cet article que de très jeunes femmes furent condamnées à mort et exécutées pour les crimes qu’elles ont commis dans les camps. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 2, November 1994, pp. 211-218 Symposium A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on A Progress of Sentiments by Annette C. Baier, held at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, March 1994. Response to My Critics ANNETTE C. BAIER I thank my critics for their generous compliments on what they find good about my (...) book, and thank them even more for their criticisms. Both my critics query the role given to reason, in my version of Hume's version of our nature. If David Owen is right, I downplay Hume's scepticism, in Treatise Book I, about what we can expect of what he there calls our reason, and, if Rachel Cohon is right, I downplay Hume's scepticism in Books II and III about the role of reason in our passionate and active lives. Cohon even charges that my Hume is barely distinguishable from Samuel Clarke. Grave charges! In response, I want first to concede that in A Progress of Sentiments I should have given more space to the section "Of scepticism with regard to reason" than I did, and that, even though I did not purport to more than touch on Hume's attitude to other philosophers, I should have more explicitly acknowledged the background role of Clarke as Hume's target, throughout the Treatise, and given more emphasis to Hume's anti-religious aims, which I mention from time to time, but do not dwell on. I could also have given more prominence to Hume's treatment of liberty and necessity, and have said a bit more about Hume's section, "Morality not based on reason." As Rachel Cohon says, I dismiss what, for some, is the distinctively Humean claim that morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions as largely an ad hominem move against rationalists who expect their pronouncements about eternal fitnesses, or divine commands, to produce or prevent actions, possibly by exciting fear of divine punishment. The Humean moral sentiment, I claimed, is not an Annette C. Baier is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA. 212 Annette C. Baier especially motivating passion, although it does normally produce good will towards those whose character traits it approves, and some dislike of those whose character traits are disapproved. So it may excite some self-dislike, when it is our own character that we find distasteful, or produce some pride, if we pass muster. Hume writes: "There may perhaps, be some, who being accustom 'd to the style of the schools and pulpit, and having never consider'd human nature in any other light than that in which they place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look on as a vice..." (T 297). So Humean morals does often excite passions. But pride and humility, Hume claims, are "compleat in themselves," not "attended with any desire" (T 367), so are not directly motivating passions. And even the love and hatred that are felt towards fellow persons for their virtues and vices may, as motivating influences on the will, have to compete with other loves, such as esteem for the rich and powerful. Hume is a realistic and often rather cynical moralist, and has no easy story about how the moral sentiment can produce the virtues of which it approves. Still, there is some active power in the moral sentiment. It is an impression, namely a sentiment or "peculiar pleasure," not an idea, and so not a belief. In my book I first contrasted Humean sentiments with beliefs in Chapter 1, discussing the conclusion of Book I, and then continued to discuss passions in Chapter 2, on association. There it is said plainly enough that, for Hume, it is pleasure and pain on which most of our passions are founded. (He exempts some instinctive desires.) His own decision to continue with his philosophical journey, after the near shipwreck of Part 4 of Book I, is based, he claims, on the fact that he would be the loser in point of pleasure if he inhibited his philosophical impulses. But... (shrink)

Habituellement le processus de deuil suite à la mort d’une personne significative évolue favorablement vers une fin, marquée par la réorganisation de la vie et la capacité de réinvestissement chez l’endeuillé. Mais le deuil peut se compliquer. L’absence de deuil ou le deuil-non-fait en est une complication grave à l’origine de désordres somatiques et psychologiques et d’une entrave au bon développement psychique chez l’endeuillé et même sa descendance. L’auteur présente deux observations cliniques de deuils-non-faits qui illustrent d’une part, le concept (...) de crypte avec l’identification d’un enfant épileptique à un « double » mort tenu au secret, et d’autre part, celui d’absence symbolique de sépulture où le mort reste « accroché » au vivant. Ces observations montrent aussi qu’un deuil peut n’être pas définitivement gelé et s’enclencher bien des années plus tard, avec même, une surprenante facilité, pourvu que le deuil soit entendu. (shrink)

Cet article, dans une perspective sémiopragmatique, interroge la disposition graphique des textes comme élément d'interface avec le lecteur. Il s'agit plus précisément d'examiner comment les signes organisateursde l'écrit - cadres, bords et marges- interviennent dans l'acte de lecture.What does the graphic organization of texts have to do with the mental construction of the reader ? How do indexical signs give him a direction ? Between semiotics and psychology, they remind us that the body and perception are important even through the (...) use of codified social models. (shrink)

Nach der Edition der Expositio in Ps 59 und der Expositio orationis dominicae (P. van Deun [ed.], Maximi Confessoris Opuscula exegetica duo. [CChr.SG, 23.] Turnhout/Leuven 1991.] legt van Deun (D.) mit dem hier anzuzeigenden Band nun den Liber Asceticus des Maximus Confessor (erstmals) in einer kritischen Edition vor.

Comment envisager les concepts de peine et de sanction dans le contexte du droit et de la morale? C'est pour réfléchir à cette question que se sont réunis, à l'occasion de la Journée d'études du 13 novembre 2007 intitulée : « Entre droit et morale : la finalité de la peine », des juristes de renom et des historiens des idées. Ceux-ci étaient invités par l'équipe du Centre de Recherches Pluridisciplinaires et Multilingues de l'Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense. Les (...) travaux réunis exposent en particulier le statut de la sanction pénale dans différents Etats européens, de l'Antiquité grecque et romaine à la période moderne. Est particulièrement mis en valeur le tournant pris par le droit pénal à la fin du 18ème, début du 19èmesiècle, à partir des conceptions innovantes d'un fonctionnaire de l'Etat autrichien en Lombardie, Beccaria, qui a repensé le droit de punir de l'Ancien Régime, puis de la philosophie de la peine développée en Angleterre par Bentham. Pour terminer, l'ouvrage présente les réflexions de Nietzsche sur la faute dont l'originalité se résume en ces termes : comment « surveiller sans punir »? (shrink)

Nach der Edition der Expositio in Ps 59 und der Expositio orationis dominicae (P. van Deun [ed.], Maximi Confessoris Opuscula exegetica duo. [CChr.SG, 23.] Turnhout/Leuven 1991.] legt van Deun (D.) mit dem hier anzuzeigenden Band nun den Liber Asceticus des Maximus Confessor (erstmals) in einer kritischen Edition vor.

Department of Medical Education, Flinders University of South Australia, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide SA 5001. Tel. : +61-8-7225-1111; Fax: +61-8-8204-5675; Email: lee0359{at}flinders.edu.au ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- ->.This paper analyses the role of communication strategies in pandemic influenza planning. Our central concern is with the extent to which nations are using communication to address issues of social justice. Issues associated with disadvantage and vulnerability to infection in the event of an influenza pandemic raise (...) distinct questions about how well less well off groups will be protected. The potential for a public health emergency of this type to exacerbate existing inequalities, making those in less well off positions worse off, makes social justice an important consideration for pandemic planners. National PI plans offer insights into the ways that nations may use communication to address issues of disadvantage, thereby providing a way of examining how communication strategies are presented and their potential to mitigate inequities. Our research reviewed 12 national PI plans and assessed the extent to which nations are using communication to assist and limit possible harms to less well off groups. We outline in this paper some important issues and considerations associated with social justice and flu planning, in particular if and how plans are addressing inequalities. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely (...) available to human agents. After exploring the limitations of existing formal algorithmic fairness strategies, the article argues that procedural justice requires that human agents relying wholly or in part on algorithmic systems proceed with caution: by avoiding doxastic negligence about algorithmic outputs, by exercising deliberative capacities when making similarity judgments, and by suspending belief and gathering additional information in light of higher-order uncertainty. (shrink)

Let us begin with a fundamental realization: No amount of thinking and no amount of public policy have brought us any closer to understanding and solving the problem of crime. The more we have reacted to crime, the farther we have removed ourselves from any understanding and any reduction of the problem. In recent years, we have floundered desperately in reformulating the law, punishing the offender, and quantifying our knowledge. Yet this country remains one of the most crime-ridden nations. In (...) spite of all its wealth, economic development, and scientific advances, this country has one of the worst crime records in the world.With such realization, we return once again—as if starting anew—to the subject of crime, a subject that remains one of our most critical indicators of the state of our personal and collective being. If what is to be said seems outrageous and heretical, it is only because it is necessarily outside the conventional wisdom both of our understanding of the problem and of our attempt to solve it. (shrink)

We discuss the variety of sorts of sympathy Hume recognizes, the extent to which he thinks our sympathy with others’ feelings depends on inferences from the other’s expression, and from her perceived situation, and consider also whether he later changed his views about the nature and role of sympathy, in particular its role in morals.

Given that written texts are characterized by indexicality and incompleteness; how is it that they are read and followed then judged adequate? In particular how are social scientific arguments read as plausible under such conditions? It is suggested that the very natural language that renders such arguments in principle problematic, provides a resource in its textual particulars for the repair of indexicality. The article analyzes some local textual features with methods borrowed from conversational analysis to demonstrate three reader/writer strategies 'age (...) orientation', the categorization of a population as more than incidentally juvenile; establishing 'author authority' ; and 'investing' (apparently senseless actors with 'purpose'. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a theoretical and political role for ‘white ignorance’, present three alternative accounts of white ignorance, and assess how well each fulfils this role. On the Willful Ignorance View, white ignorance refers to white individuals’ willful ignorance about racial injustice. On the Cognitivist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance resulting from social practices that distribute faulty cognitive resources. On the Structuralist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance that results as part of a social process that systematically (...) gives rise to racial injustice, and is an active player in the process. I argue that, because of its greater power and flexibility, the Structuralist View better explains the patterns of ignorance that we observe, better illuminates the connection to white racial domination, and is overall better suited to the project of ameliorating racial injustice. As such, the Structuralist View should be preferred. (shrink)